Nahost-"Friedensprozess", anno 1939

... oder plus ça change, plus c'est la même chose:

"The British did not accept all the mufti's demands and were unable to bridge the gaps between Arab and Jewish positions. On 17 May they issued their new policy, the White Paper of 1939, based on the understandings they had reached with the delegations from the other Arab countries. The principal points were severe restrictions on Jewish immigration to Palestine and Jewish land purchases and agreement in principle to the establishment of an independent Palestinian state within ten years - if Jewish-Arab relations would allow proper administration of the country. On the following day the Higher Arab Committee discussed the proposal. Hajj Amin chaired the meeting, which was attended by five other members. They decided to reject the White Paper, despite the fact that it included significant gains for the Arabs. The four members who were absent from this meeting favored acceptance of the British decision; they remained in the minority. The Nashashibis' announcement that they supported the new British policy was only of marginal significance because of their political weakness. So, despite the White Paper's many benefits for Arabs, and even though most of the Arab public in Palestine viewed it as an achievement, the official Palestinian Arab leadership rejected it.

The campaign against the opposition and its leaders continued after the promulgation of the White Paper, and it did not end when the rebellion ended. Ihsan al-Nahmer, an oppositionist in Nablus, discerned after the fact that there was a pattern to the rebel actions - they killed a prominent opposition figure in each of the country's regions: Rafe' al-Fahoum in Nazareth, Dr. Anwar Shuqayri in Acre, Ahmad and Muhammad Irshein in Jenin, Hasan Sidqi al-Dajani in Jerusalem, Nassir al-Din in Hebron, and prominent leaders in the villages. This was in addition to the death sentences passed on figures such as Fakhri Nashashibi and Fakhri 'Abd Al-Hadi, which were proclaimed publicly. In this way the Husseini leadership silenced opposition political voices (although oppositionists continued to extend military and intelligence aid to the British and Zionists)."

Aus: Hillel Cohen, Army of Shadows. Palestinian collaboration with Zionism, 1917-1948, Berkeley, Los Angeles, London, 2008, S.133-134. Die Fußnoten habe ich übersprungen.