Gelesen in der jüngsten Ausgabe der Working Papers der Luxemburger Zentralbank ("The role of collateral requirements in the crisis: one tool for two objectives?" von Paolo Fegatelli, als .pdf hier):
"(...) from the point of view of the theoretical debate, the quality and the extent of the 'paradigm change' (...) are now clear. The thorough inversion of roles between central bank refinancing and interbank market was such that, while the money/credit supply curve in the interbank market has now become nearly vertical - at least in its upper section (unsecured money market) - the same curve in the central bank funds market has, on the contrary, become completely horizontal. That is, overall money supply is today critically conditioned by the decisions of the central bank (which, on the other hand, has decided for the moment that its money supply should be purely demand-driven). Thus, the collapse of Lehman and the related decision by the U.S. authorities not to save the bank, have suddenly thrown us in the ideal world assumed by Milton Friedman at the heart of his theory. This sounds paradoxical for two categories of people in particular:
1) post-Keynesian theorists, who have now certainly won the war waged in the past 30 years, but whose universe has vanished in the very same moment in which they have realized their victory;
2) central bankers, who fancy the 'good old times' in which they had to think twice on nothing more than the price at which selling their 'niche product', and now dream of an exit strategy leading back to the 'untroubled' world of post-Keynesians."
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