Posts mit dem Label Panarchie werden angezeigt. Alle Posts anzeigen
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April 17, 2013

159 Jahre Benjamin Tucker

 
Contract or organism, what's that to us? (1887)
 
Some very interesting and valuable discussion is going on in the London Jus concerning the question of compulsory versus voluntary taxation. In the issue of June 17 there is a communication from F. W. Read, in which the following passage occurs:
The voluntary taxation proposal really means the dissolution of the State into its constituent atoms, and leaving them to recombine in some way or no way, just as it may happen. There would be nothing to prevent the existence of five or six States in England, and members of all these States might be living in the same house! The proposal is, it appears to me, the outcome of an idea in the minds of those who propound it that the State is, or ought to be, founded on contract, just as a joint-stock company is. It is a similar idea to the defunct original contract theory. It was thought the State must rest upon a contract. There had been no contract in historic times; it was therefore assumed that there had been a prehistoic contract. The voluntary taxationist says there never has been any contract: therefore the State has never had any ethical basis; therefore we will not make a contract. The explanation of the whole matter, I believe, is that given by Mr. Wordsworth Donisthorpe,—viz., that the State is a social organism, evolved as every other organism is evolved, and not requiring any more than other organisms to be based upon a contract either original or contemporary.
The idea that the voluntary taxationist objects to the State precisely because it does not rest on contract, and wishes to substitute contract for it, is strictly correct, and I am glad to see (for the first time, if my memory serves me) an opponent grasp it. But Mr. Read obscures his statement by his previous remark that the proposal of voluntary taxation is the outcome of an idea … that the State is, or ought to be, founded on contract. This would be true if the words which I have italicized should be omitted. It was the insertion of these words that furnished the writer the basis for his otherwise groundless analogy between the Anarchists and the followers of Rousseau. The latter hold that the State originated in a contract, and that the people of to-day, though they did not make it, are bound by it. The Anarchists, on the contrary, deny that any such contract was ever made; declare that, had one ever been made, it could not impose a shadow of obligation on those who had no hand in making it; and claim the right to contract for themselves as they please. the position that a man may make his own contracts, far from being analogous to that which makes him subject to contracts made by others, is its direct antithesis.
It is perfectly true that voluntary taxation would not necessarily prevent the existence of five or six States in England, and that members of all these States might be living in the same house. But I see no reason for Mr. Read’s exclamation point after this remark. What of it? There are many more than five or six Churches in England, and it frequently happens that members of several of them live in the same house. There are many more than five or six insurance companies in England, and it is by no means uncommon for members of the same family to insure their lives and goods against accident or fire in different companies. Does any harm come of it? Why, then, should there not be a considerable number of defensive associations in England, in which people, even members of the same family, might insure their lives and goods against murderers or thieves? Though Mr. Read has grasped one idea of the voluntary taxationists, I fear that he sees another much less clearly,—namely, the idea that defence is a service, like any other service; that it is labor both useful and desired, nad therefore an economic commodity subject to the law of supply and demand; that in a free market this commodity would be furnished at the cost of production; that, competition prevailing, patronage would go to those who furnished the best article at the lowest price; that the production and sale of this commodity are now monopolized by the State; that the State, like almost all monopolists, charges exorbitant prices; that, like almost all monopolists, it supplies a worthless, or nearly worthless, article; that, just as the monopolist of a food product often furnishes poison instead of nutriment, so the State takes advantage of its monopoly of defence to furnish invasion instead of protection; that, just as the patrons of the one pay to be poisoned, so the patrons of the other pay to be enslaved; and finally, that the State exceeds all its fellow-monopolists in the extent of its villainy because it enjoys the unique privilege of compelling all people to buy its product whether they want it or not. If, then, five or six States were to han out their shingles, the people, I fancy, would be able to buy the very best kind of security at a reasonable price. And what is more,—the better their services, the less they would be needed; so that the multiplication of States involves the abolition of the State.
All these considerations, however, are disposed of, in Mr. Read’s opinion, by his final assertion that the State is a social organism. He considers this the explanation of the whole matter. But for the life of me I can see in it nothing but another irrelevant remark. Again I ask: What of it? suppose the State is an organism,—what then? What is the inference? That the State is therefore permanent? But what is history but a record of the dissolution of organisms and the birth and growth of others to be dissolved in turn? Is the State exempt from this order? If so, why? What proves it? The State is an organism? Yes; so is a tiger. But unless I meet him where I haven’t my gun, his organism will speedily disorganize. The State is a tiger seeking to devour the people, and they must either kill or cripple it. Their own safety depends upon it. But Mr. Read says it can’t be done. By no possibility can the power of the State be restrained. This must be very disappointing to Mr. Donisthorpe and Jus, who are working to restrain it. If Mr. Read is right, their occupation is gone. Is he right? Unless he can demonstrate it, the voluntary taxationists and the Anarchists will continue their work, cheered by the belief that the compulsory and invasive State is doomed to die.
(Liberty No. 104 vom 30. Juli 1887, S.4).

März 02, 2013

87 Jahre Murray Rothbard

Eine der Spezifitäten des rothbardschen Systems dass er letztlich "naturrechtlich" abgeleitete Eigentumsrechte über freiwillige Vereinbarungen stellt:
"The right of property implies the right to make contracts about that property: to give it away or to exchange titles of ownership for the property of another person. Unfortunately, many libertarians, devoted to the right to make contracts, hold the contract itself to be an absolute, and therefore maintain that any voluntary contract whatever must be legally enforceable in the free society. Their error is a failure to realize that the right to contract is strictly derivable from the right of private property, and therefore that the only enforceable contracts (i.e., those backed by the sanction of legal coercion) should be those where the failure of one party to abide by the contract implies the theft of property from the other party. In short, a contract should only be enforceable when the failure to fulfill it is an implicit theft of property. But this can only be true if we hold that validly enforceable contracts only exist where title to property has already been transferred, and therefore where the failure to abide by the contract means that the other party’s property is retained by the delinquent party, without the consent of the former (implicit theft). Hence, this proper libertarian theory of enforceable contracts has been termed the “title-transfer” theory of contracts. (...)"
(aus The ethics of liberty, Kapitel 19: "Property rights and the theory of contracts")

Woraus Rothbard ableitet, was alles in einer libertären Rechtsordnung verboten - da illegitim - sind, etwa fractional reserve banking, GmbHs oder Bankrottregelungen.

Hierzu schreibt der Panarchist Adam Knott, meines Erachtens zu Recht:
"Rothbard, C, is saying to two people, A and B: Here is what you are allowed to do between yourselves, and here is what you are not allowed to do between yourselves. This is my natural law system, that is absolute, immutable, and of universal validity for all times and places...  Therefore, you, A and B, cannot do such and such between yourselves. You can only do what my system says.
Rothbard's point might be that then, A and B could do something that would spill over and effect person C. But my point is that this is why C has a government, to protect his (C's) rights. So for the cases of conflicting value systems or overlapping jurisdictions, the governments of A and B, and of C, have to arrive at some solution.
Rothbard is saying: No, the solution is for A and B to belong to the Rothbardian society !  
Question: Will this be by force, or by voluntary consent of A and B ?
I think that part of the problem is that the Rothbardian school of libertarianism bases its concept of liberty on property. But others base their concept of liberty on voluntary consent. Thus, the Rothbardian system ends up contradicting voluntary consent, because it arrives at an abstract conception of property that is based on a specific individual's theory, and considers as invalid a priori, any property arrangements at variance with the theory, even if voluntarily chosen by the individuals concerned. It also considers as invalid a priori, alternative or rival theories of property. Implicit in the private property ethicist's theory of property is the implication that the core property theory of the philosopher and his students is more important than voluntary consent, and more important than the property relations accepted by other individuals amongst themselves. The private property ethicist's theory of property does not allow voluntary consent in regard to property, nor does it allow alternative theories of property. The private property ethic is considered by its adherents to be 'absolute, immutable, and of universal validity for all times and places'."
(with thanks to the author Adam Knott, and to Christian Butterbach for the text and backchecking with Adam!)

April 30, 2012

147 Jahre Max Nettlau

"Seit langem fasziniert mich der Gedanke, wie schön es doch wäre, wenn endlich einmal in der allgemeinen Auffassung über die Aufeinanderfolge der politischen und sozialen Einrichtungen das verhängnisvolle Wort nacheinander durch das so einfache und selbstverständliche nebeneinander ersetzt würde. 'Nieder mit dem Staat!', 'Nur auf den Trümmern des Staates...' sind Empfindungen und Wünsche Vieler, denen aber doch wohl nur das kühle Heraus aus dem Staat [...] zur Durchführung verhelfen kann.
Tritt in einer Wissenschaft eine neue Erkenntnis zu Tage, so arbeiten eben die davon Überzeugten auf dem neuen Weg einfach weiter, ohne die alten Professoren, die dem nicht folgen wollen oder können, überzeugen, zur Akzeptierung der neuen Methode zwingen oder totschlagen zu wollen; die geraten von selbst ins Hintertreffen und verkümmern und vertrocknen, wenn die neue Methode das richtige Leben in sich hat. Allerdings kann in vielen Fällen der böse Wille und die Dummheit der neuen Idee vieles in den Weg legen; darum müssen für die unbedingte gegenseitige Toleranz harte Kämpfe ausgefochten werden, bis sie errungen ist; erst dann geht alles von selbst, die Wissenschaft blüht und gedeiht, weil der für jeden Fortschritt nötige Boden der Versuchsfreiheit und freien Forschung gewonnen ist.
Nur nicht immer 'alles unter einen Hut bringen wollen' - das ist dem Staat nicht gelungen: die Sozialisten und Anarchisten entschlüpften dieser Macht; und das dürfte uns auch nicht gelingen, denn die 'Staatsmenschen' sind nun einmal noch da. Es müßte übrigens uns selbst nur angenehm sein, so einen eingefleischten Staatskrüppel nicht in unserer freien Gesellschaft mitschleppen zu brauchen, und die oft erörterte Frage, was denn mit den Reaktionären geschehen soll, die sich der Freiheit nicht anpassen können, würde dadurch sehr einfach gelöst: die mögen sich ihren Staat behalten, solange sie wollen - nur hat er für uns nicht mehr Bedeutung, über uns nicht mehr Macht, als die verschrobenen Ideen irgend einer religiösen Sekte, um die sich niemand kümmert. So wird es früher oder später kommen; die Freiheit bricht sich überall Bahn.
Als wir einmal auf dem Comosee fuhren, bestieg eine Mailänder Lehrerin mit einer großen Schulklasse das Dampfschiff. Sie wollte, daß sich die Kinder alle niedersetzten und rannte von einer Gruppe zur anderen, das Niedersetzen anordnend - aber kaum hatte sie einer Gruppe den Rücken gedreht, standen die meisten sofort auf und so oft sie das Ganze überblickte, wenn sie, mit dem Ordnen der Kinder fertig zu sein glaubte, standen sie in demselben Durcheinander da wie früher. Statt nun 'streng' zu werden, lachte die junge Frau selbst darüber und ließ die Kinder in Ruhe, von denen sich die meisten bald von selbst niedersetzten. Das ist ein harmloses Beispiel, wie alles, sich selbst überlassen, sich am besten löst, und bevor sich die Idee der gegenseitigen Toleranz in politischen und sozialen Dingen Bahn bricht, könnten wir, nebenbei gesagt, nichts besseres tun, als uns selbst hierfür vorzubereiten, indem wir sie in unserm eigenen täglichen Leben und Denken ins Werk setzen; wie oft handeln wir noch selbst ihr entgegen?
Diese Worte sollen zeigen, wie lieb mir diese Idee geworden ist, und begreiflich machen, daß ich mich freue, in einem verschollenen Aufsatz einen Vorläufer dieser Idee gefunden zu haben, von der sonst in unserer Literatur, der der Kampf freilich aufgezwungen wurde, nicht viel die Rede ist. Ich meine den Artikel Panarchie von P. E. de Puydt in der Revue Trimestrielle (Brüssel), Juli 1860, SS. 222 - 245. Der mir sonst bis jetzt unbekannte Verfasser, um den ich mich noch nicht kümmerte, um mir den Eindruck seiner Ideen nicht zu stören, steht den sozialen Bewegungen wohl fern, hat aber einen klaren Blick dafür, wie das jetzige politische System, nach welchem sich Alle einer durch Majoritätsbeschluß oder sonst irgendwie entstandenen Regierung fügen sollen, einfach dem elementarsten Freiheitsbedürfnis ins Gesicht schlägt."

Auszug aus: "Panarchie. Eine verschollene Idee von 1860", in Der Sozialist vom 22. Februar 1909. Den ganzen Artikel findet man hier: http://www.panarchy.org/nettlau/1909.de.html